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Chapter 1
Evolution of the National 
Labor Relations Act
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the 
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce 
and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred 
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and 
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self- 
organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employ 
ment or other mutual aid or protection.
National Labor Relations Act, 1935
As stated above, the National Labor Relations Act was 
passed in 1935 in order to protect workers' civil liberties with 
regard to the right to seek union representation and to 
bargain collectively with employers. Although these rights 
were not to be fully sanctioned by the law until the Supreme 
Court ruled on the Act's constitutionality in 1937, passage of 
the Act was a permanent and radical departure from 
American labor law history.
This report comes nearly 50 years after passage of the Na 
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) but, as reported herein, 
much of the intent embodied in the Act is presently being 
frustrated and to no small degree. The focus of this study is 
upon investigating why 25-30 percent of the time workers, 
after exercising their rights under secret ballot to be 
represented by unions, fail to negotiate contracts with 
employers. As will be fully documented herein, NLRB case
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handling delays, discriminatory discharges of union ac 
tivists, and employer refusals to bargain are major im 
pediments circumventing the "protected" rights of workers 
to union representation.
Chapter 1 provides a brief historical overview of American 
federal labor law. Although our history of union- 
management relations has been marked by considerable con 
flict including the loss of lives and destruction of private 
property chapter 1 does not focus on these tribulations. In 
stead, its purpose is to trace the legal antecedents and lay out 
the framework of our present labor law. Chapter 2 reviews 
the workings of the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), which is the federal agency charged with inter 
preting and applying the NLRA. The chapter's primary 
focus is upon the policies and administrative procedures of 
the NLRB in protecting the rights of workers to bargain col 
lectively once they have gained those rights through secret 
ballot voting. These first two chapters are written to provide 
essential background material for chapters 3 and 4. Chapter
3 presents an investigation and analysis of the factors that 
help explain the dismal failure of unions (in general) to ob 
tain first contracts after winning the right to negotiate those 
contracts. Based on these findings, various public policy 
recommendations to better safeguard the legislated rights of 
workers to bargain collectively are discussed and evaluated 
in chapter 4. Finally, chapter 5 briefly summarizes the key 
points, findings, and recommendations of the study.
A Period of Judicial Hostility
Before describing the purposes behind and enactment of 
the NLRA in 1935 and its amendments in 1947 and 1959, let 
us take a brief look at the legal history of labor relations in 
early America. The story begins with union organizing ef 
forts in the early 1800s. The most celebrated case and the one 
that set the early tone for union organizing and collective
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bargaining was the 1806 Philadelphia Cordwainers Case. 
Cordwainers (better known as shoe and bootmakers) in 
Philadelphia initially organized a guild of journeymen, the 
purpose being to insure quality products. Later, however, 
with a rapid extension of product markets and increasing 
competition, the journeymen were motivated to maintain 
their earning power. In their efforts to raise wages and secure 
"closed" shop agreements (i.e., every worker must be a 
union member), the shoemakers found themselves in court. 
The 1806 case led the Philadelphia court to find the union to 
be nothing less than a form of criminal conspiracy. The con 
spiracy doctrine was based on several governing principles of 
English common law, including:
  Unions interfere with the freedom of contract and prop 
erty rights of both individual workers and employers.
  Unions have monopoly power and are thus disruptive to 
both market competition and to the political system.
The so-called conspiracy doctrine took hold in the various 
courts of early America and workers were largely deterred 
from even forming unions (see Wellington, 1968, pp. 7-26).
Not until the early 1840s did the conspiracy doctrine begin 
to give way. In the landmark case of Commonwealth v. 
Hunt, a Massachusetts Supreme Court judge decided a case 
where a union of shoemakers refused to work for their 
employer unless the employer fired a "scab" (i.e., a non 
union worker). Judge Shaw reasoned that the court must be 
a neutral umpire in deciding union organizing and collective 
bargaining rights. To find a union unlawful under the con 
spiracy doctrine, Judge Shaw held, the courts must find the 
objectives and/or activities of a union unlawful. In and of 
themselves, unions were not unlawful.
Shaw's decision, however, does not appear to have had all 
that much influence upon restricting the courts' use of the 
conspiracy doctrine only the focus had shifted. Employers 
turned to the courts to block specific union activity strikes,
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pickets, and boycotts. The courts after 1842 acted much like 
my landlady who, concerned primarily about the interests of 
her other tenants, agreed to let me have a piano in my apart 
ment as long as I did not play it!
The conspiracy doctrine began to wane in the late 1800s, 
but was replaced by court injunctions. There appeared to be 
little consistency in the judicial justifications for enjoining 
union activity, but the evidence suggests that injunctions 
were very easy to obtain, often without hearing the unions' 
side.
After the criminal sanction had been replaced by 
the injunction, the courts had continued to act far 
beyond their range of competency; adjudicating 
without standards, without principles, and without 
restraint. . . . The abuse, moreover, extended to 
the procedures the courts employed and the decrees 
they issued as well as to the substantive law they 
developed. . . . Standards of fair procedure and 
experience with equitable remedies existed, but 
were simply disregarded. (Wellington, 1968, p. 39)
An important development in federal law in 1890 was 
unanticipated. The Sherman Antitrust Act was passed by the 
U.S. Congress, ostensibly to impede the monopolistic ap 
petite of industrial conglomerates. Ironically, employers 
were able to utilize this piece of legislation against unions 
who, it was reasoned, had monopolistic characteristics in 
tended to restrain competition and disrupt interstate com 
merce. It is of interest to note that disruption to commerce 
and competition was one of the principles underlying the 
criminal conspiracy doctrine. It is also important to 
underscore here that judges for the first time based their 
decisions upon interpretation of federal legislation, albeit 
their perverse interpretation of the law probably would not 
have arisen without widespread judicial hostility toward 
unionization.
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The history of the application of the Antitrust Act to 
union activities was most interesting. Case after case, both 
lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court found unions in 
violation of the law typically in cases where unions em 
barked upon boycotts. It was not until 1908, however, that 
the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the Sherman Anti 
trust Act was applicable to union organizing. Here, the 
United Hatters of North America, in an organizing drive, 
engaged in a nationwide boycott against Loewe and Com 
pany of Danbury, Connecticut. The Court decided the Hat 
ters violated the antitrust law in "that the act prohibits any 
combination whatever to secure action which essentially 
obstructs the free flow of commerce between the states, or 
restricts in that regard, the liberty of a trader to engage in 
business." 1
Shortly after the Danbury Hatters case, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Clayton Act. Unions first billed this act as a ma 
jor victory as it was believed to have exempted unions from 
antitrust prosecution. The act stated that neither labor 
organizations nor their members could "be held or con 
strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint 
of trade, under the antitrust laws." The president of the 
American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, declared 
the Clayton Act (Section 6) as the "Industrial Magna Charta 
upon which the working people will rear their construction 
of industrial freedom." (Witte, 1932, p. 68) It soon became 
clear, however, that the act only stated that unions, in and of 
themselves, were not illegal something the courts had 
generally recognized after Commonwealth v. Hunt in 1842.
An important Court decision in 1921 laid to rest any ques 
tion of the value of the Clayton Act to union organizing. In 
the Duplex decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court 
ruled against the International Association of Machinists 
(I AM). The I AM, in seeking union recognition and bargain 
ing rights, had pressed boycotts against the products of 
Duplex Printing Company of Battle Creek, Michigan. The
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high Court ruled that the boycott was illegal under the Sher- 
man Antitrust Act. 2
Throughout the 1920s, the lower courts (and even the 
Supreme Court) frequently used the Sherman Antitrust Act 
to enjoin union organizing activity. Furthermore, prior to 
1921 the federal courts restricted the application of the an 
titrust law against boycotts in general and against strikes in 
the railroad industry, but after 1921 they widened the ap 
plication to include ordinary strike activity undertaken in all 
kinds of industries.
Another popular ploy of employers during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s was to have employees sign individual con 
tracts of employment prohibiting them from joining or act 
ing in behalf of unions. These contracts were dubbed by 
union organizers as "yellow-dog" contracts. Under the 
pretense of freedom-of-contract principles (one of the prin 
ciples underpinning the criminal conspiracy doctrine), 
employers would use the contracts as effective deterrents to 
union organizing. When union organizers attempted to 
organize an employer's workforce, the employer would seek 
an injunction against the organizers. Union organizers, it 
was argued before the courts, were attempting to cause 
employees to "breech" their private contracts with the 
employer.
In spite of the fact that several states passed laws and the 
U.S. Congress passed the Erdman Act in 1898 that forbade 
employers in the railroad industry from executing yellow- 
dog contracts, their use became quite widespread especially 
after the Supreme Court ruled in 1908 that such contracts 
were legal. 3 Here, the United Mine Workers (UMW) attemp 
ted to organize the workers of Hitchman Coal and Coke 
Company in West Virginia. Aware that the Hitchman 
employees had signed yellow-dog contracts as a condition of 
employment, the UMW organizers attempted to get workers 
to "agree" to union representation, but not actually join the 
union per se. The union's strategy was to convince a majori-
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ty of workers to agree to union representation and subse 
quently call a strike for recognition. The Court ruled, 
however, that the union was still attempting to convince 
workers to breech contracts, which the majority of the Court 
believed workers entered into on a "voluntary" basis.
What this meant to collective bargaining and 
unionization was indeed profound. Faced with an 
organization campaign, the employer made the ex 
ecution of the yellow-dog contract a condition of 
employment. In periods of less than full employ 
ment, workers would be economically coerced into 
the agreement. The employer then applied for an 
injunction restraining any person who might en 
courage workers to join a union. Any disobedience 
to the injunction was punishable as contempt of 
court. (Taylor and Witney, 1983, p. 45)
Injunctions against union organizing and collective 
bargaining activity had become so widespread in the early 
1900s that the period has generally been characterized as 
"government by injunction." Our brief review of the era of 
injunctions, however, would not be complete without 
referencing the historic "Debs" case. In that case, the 
American Railway Union in 1894 induced a series of strikes 
against the railroads. The Union was attempting to force the 
Pullman Car Company to reinstate a number of discharged 
union leaders and to negotiate over Pullman's cut in wages. 
A lower court enjoined the union and shortly after imprison 
ed its president, Eugene Debs, for violating the terms of that 
injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court, upon hearing the 
union's appeal, decided that the use of injunctions was con 
stitutional. 4 Coupled with the blessing of the Court, the na 
tional publicity surrounding the strikes invariably populariz 
ed the use of injunctions by employers seeking to block 
union organizing and impede union power in collective 
bargaining.
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Antecedents to the NLRA
Except for a brief period during World War I when Presi 
dent Wilson got a pledge from both labor and industry 
leaders to avoid strikes and established the War Labor Board 
to help resolve labor disputes, it was not until 1926 that the 
federal government successfully intervened to promote in 
dustrial peace, support collective bargaining, and protect 
workers' rights to organize. That government initiative was 
embodied in the Railway Labor Act of 1926. The Act, albeit 
limited to the railroads, stands as a major precursor to and 
model for the NLRA that followed in 1935. Congress, in 
enacting the Railway Labor Act, sought labor-management 
peace in the railroad industry. The assumption was that the 
process of collective bargaining could bring that peace and 
that procedures for mediation and arbitration of disputes 
could facilitate any necessary resolution of disputes. Of 
greater interest to our present inquiry, the framers of the 
1926 Act presumed that nonunionized workers would elect 
representatives for collective bargaining. It had become ap 
parent that many carriers had established "company 
unions" to "represent" the interests of the workers. But 
these company unions were effectively controlled or 
dominated by company officials. They had no affiliation 
with union organizations outside of the company and the 
company restricted negotiable issues. The legitimacy of the 
company union practices under the Railway Act was soon 
tested in the courts. The Brotherhood of Railroad Clerks 
charged that the Texas & New Orleans Railroad had violated 
the new law because it would not recognize and bargain with 
them. Instead, the railroad had established its own company 
union, the "Association of Clerical Employees - Southern 
Pacific Line." Upon reaching the high court in 1930, to the 
surprise of many, the Court ordered the railroad to cease its 
interference with the right of workers to select their own 
union representatives. 5 The Court, therefore, also upheld the 
constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act. And although 
the law was thwarted by continued use of company
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dominated unions until further amended in 1934, the 
Supreme Court's decision was a historic moment in labor 
relations law. For the first time, the Court had recognized 
the right of the federal government to enact legislation in 
tended to protect workers' rights to self-organization and to 
encourage collective bargaining.
After the Railway Labor Act of 1926 had been enacted, 
Congress was apparently in the mood to legislate away some 
of the inequities imposed by the courts upon labor- 
management relations. In 1927, public hearings over an anti- 
injunction bill were begun. In 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act was enacted, which had been constructed to greatly cur 
tail the use of injunctions against union organizing and col 
lective bargaining. The Act very clearly stipulated that the 
courts were to leave unions free to strike, to picket, and to 
boycott. Only in cases where violence or fraud were present 
or union activity fell outside the scope of a very broadly 
defined "labor dispute," were the courts free to enjoin 
union related activity. In addition, the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act made yellow-dog contracts unenforceable in the courts. 
Again, to the surprise of many, the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of that act.
A further legislative development that was to serve the 
union movement was passage of the National Industrial 
Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933, a cornerstone of President 
Roosevelt's general New Deal plan to bring the country out 
of the depths of the great depression. Section 7(a) of the 
NIRA is of particular interest here, as it had the purpose of 
protecting the rights of workers to form or join unions of 
their choosing and to engage in collective bargaining. The 
underlying purpose of Congress in Section 7(a) was to in 
crease the purchasing power of workers and consequently 
help the recovery of U.S. industry. Congress, however, fail 
ed to spell out what was legal or illegal behavior. Nor were 
any mechanisms provided to interpret the intent of Section 
7(a) or provide for its enforcement. A wave of union strike 
activity occurred that summer, which apparently prompted
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President Roosevelt to create the National Labor Board to 
interpret and enforce the new law. However, over the next 
year it became quite evident that the labor board could not 
effectively execute the law against employer recalcitrance 
and union impatience. Frustrated by the labor board's in 
ability to implement the law, Congress formed a new labor 
board in 1934. But, again, the labor board failed to be effec 
tive it simply could not enforce its rulings (Taylor and 
Witney, 1983, pp. 166-174). Soon thereafter, the NIRA was 
held unconstitutional in its entirety by the U.S. Supreme 
Court (1935). 6
The National Labor Relations Act
Exactly one month after the ruling by the Supreme Court, 
Congress overwhelmingly passed the National Labor Rela 
tions Act, popularly called the Wagner Act after its primary 
sponsor, senator Robert Wagner. Considerable work had 
gone into drafting the Wagner Act in the months before its 
passage. Having witnessed the struggle and inability of the 
labor boards under the NIRA to protect the rights of 
workers to self-organization and collective bargaining, con 
gressional leaders under the guidance of Senator Wagner 
foresaw the need for separate and clearly articulated legisla 
tion. That legislation, it was also believed, would need a 
labor board that could turn to the courts for enforcement.
To accomplish the broadly stated objectives of the NLRA, 
which declared that "employees shall have the right to self- 
organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively through representatives of their choos 
ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining," five unfair labor practices (ULPs) 
were spelled out. 7
1. Employers could not "interfere with, restrain, or coerce 
employees in the exercise of their rights."
2. "Domination or interference with the formation or ad 
ministration of a labor organization or contribution of 
financial or other support to it" was forbidden.
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3. Employers could not discriminate "in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in 
a labor organization."
4. Employers could not "discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee because he has filed 
charges or given testimony under the act."
5. Employers could not "refuse to bargain collectively 
with the representatives of employees duly chosen pur 
suant to other provisions of the act."
A three-member National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
was established to interpret and enforce the Wagner Act. By 
hearing charges against employers in violation of the five 
broadly defined ULPs stated in the Act, the NLRB was 
charged with making explicit those specific employer prac 
tices that were prohibited under the law. After an investiga 
tion into the merits of a complaint, the Board would order 
the employer to cease and desist his unlawful activity if they 
found the employer in violation of the Act. In addition, the 
NLRB was to fashion appropriate remedies (but not 
penalties) where necessary. In order to enforce the Board's 
rulings and remedies associated with ULPs, the Board could 
call upon the Circuit Courts of Appeal to direct employers to 
abide by Board decisions and orders. In chapter 2, we will 
examine in depth the procedures and practices of the NLRB 
with respect to union organizing and first-contract negotia 
tions.
Passage of legislation and effectuation of its purposes are 
frequently two separate accomplishments. With respect to 
the passage and effectuation of the Wagner Act, little could 
be closer to the truth. On one hand, there was widespread de 
fiance of the Act. Employers who were willing to go to great 
lengths to undermine union organizing and collective 
bargaining before the Act were no less willing to do so after 
the Act. Indeed, it appears that many employers were even 
more willing to resort to underhanded practices in order to 
skirt the law. On the other hand, the NLRB was also
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swamped by suits against its own investigative and enforce 
ment responsibilities.
By February 1936 District Courts had granted near 
ly forty temporary injunctions. Of eleven cases 
already decided the courts had ruled against the 
government in five. Some district judges enjoined 
the board even from holding hearings, the basic 
preliminary procedural step. (Auerbach, 1966, p. 
55)
It appears that these suits against the NLRB were generally 
based on questions of constitutionality. Many employers and 
their legal counsels simply believed the Wagner Act was un 
constitutional and hence openly defied it. The principle of 
freedom-of-contract, it was held, was being abridged. Fur 
thermore, the one-sidedness of the Wagner Act, wherein no 
ULPs by unions were promulgated, rubbed salt in the 
wounds of hardened anti-union employers but also disturbed 
more fair-minded employers and less interested parties.
It became quite clear that until the Supreme Court ruled 
favorably upon the constitutionality of the Wagner Act, the 
NLRB would have little effect upon enforcing its provisions. 
Employers therefore continued to discriminatorily discharge 
or refuse to hire union activists, maintain community-wide 
blacklists against union activists and sympathizers, refuse to 
recognize unions, maintain company unions, close plants in 
response to unionization, refuse to bargain in good faith 
when so ordered by the NLRB, enlist professional strike 
breaking companies, and even stockpile munitions in fac 
tories. Perhaps most appalling to the general public was the 
widespread use of professional spies hired to infiltrate 
unions, to identify union sympathizers and monitor union 
strategies with regard to organizing, negotiations, and other 
concerted activity. Some spies went so far as to take over the 
leadership of local unions; their mission was to cause inter 
nal union strife and break up organizations.
This invidious display of employer animus toward 
unionization was brought to light during the LaFollette
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Committee hearings which began in 1936. The decision to 
conduct the LaFollette hearings was in large part a response 
to the findings of investigations conducted by the NLRB in 
its earliest months of operation, findings that demonstrated 
to proponents of the Wagner Act that the purposes of the 
Act and the role of the NLRB were, without doubt, being 
undermined.
Although the LaFollette Committee investigated the 
abridgement of civil liberties other than in union- 
management relations, in its first year of hearings it detailed 
anti-union practices of industrial espionage, intimidation of 
union activists by armed private police, professional 
strikebreaking, and the stockpiling of munitions on com 
pany premises.
These accoutrements of industrial strife 
represented the underside of industrial relations. 
Their frequent use convinced the LaFollette Com 
mittee that management was conducting 'a col 
ossal, daily drive in every part of the country to 
frustrate enunciated labor policy. . . .' (Auerbach, 
1966, p. 97)
Although the LaFollette Committee made it quite evident 
to the public that workers were being denied the right to self- 
organization and collective bargaining (in the most disdain 
ful of ways), it was not until the Supreme Court (in February 
1937) ruled upon the constitutionality of the Wagner Act 
that the NLRB was able to begin effectuating the law. In that 
historic decision, probably the most important Court deci 
sion in U.S. labor history, the Court examined both the issue 
of the Act's jurisdiction with regard to interstate commerce 
and whether or not the potential of labor-management strife 
affected the free flow of commerce. The facts of the case 
dealt with the discriminatory discharge of 10 union members 
involved in organizing activities associated with a plant own 
ed by Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation. The NLRB had 
found Jones & Laughlin in violation of Section 8(a)(3), 
which forbids discrimination against employees for union
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activity. The Supreme Court's decision rested largely upon 
the following arguments.
The steel industry is one of the great basic in 
dustries of the United States, with ramifying ac 
tivities affecting interstate commerce at every 
point. . . Instead of being beyond the pale, we 
think that it presents in a most striking way the 
close and intimate relation which a manufacturing 
industry may have to interstate commerce. . .
Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free ex 
ercise of the right of employees to self-organization 
and representation is a proper subject for condem 
nation by competent legislative authority. Long 
ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. 
We said that they were organized out of the 
necessities of the situation; that a single employee 
was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he 
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the 
maintenance of himself and family; that if the 
employer refused to pay him the wages that he 
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave 
the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treat 
ment; that union was essential to give laborers op 
portunity to deal on an equality with their 
employer. . . 8
Amendments to the NLRA
The evidence indicates that after the question of constitu 
tionality of the Wagner Act was settled, union membership 
rose at an unprecedented rate, rising from some 4 million 
members in 1936 to roughly 15 million in 1947. The years 
following the Wagner Act, however, were not necessarily 
peaceful ones and it became more and more apparent that 
unions not unlike employers were willing to commit un 
palatable labor practices. With substantially greater power, 
unions were able to engage in strikes and boycotts far more 
effectively than any time in American history. With this
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power and its exercise in full public view, the public became 
more aware of its abuses. For instance, John L. Lewis, the 
powerful president of the United Mine Workers publicly 
defied President Roosevelt and the National War Labor 
Board in 1943 when he steadfastly refused to order the mine 
workers back to work during World War II. Ironically, fur 
ther abuses stemmed from the rivalry between the AFL and 
the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). The CIO 
had embarked successfully upon organizing basic industries, 
such as steel and autos, with the purpose of organizing all 
skill levels. The AFL, however, wanted all craft workers in 
these industries under their own umbrella. Unanticipated by 
the proponents of the Wagner Act, the two powerful 
organizations clashed and often fought bitterly over jurisdic- 
tional rights. The clash between the AFL and CIO tied the 
hands of many employers caught in the middle of strikes and 
boycotts over these jurisdictional disputes; workers, too, 
were caught in the middle.
Other abuses arose as unions utilized strikes and boycotts 
against employers not directly involved in given labor 
disputes, attempted to impose "closed shop"agreements on 
disinterested employees (i.e., all workers must join the union 
before being hired), and discriminated against black 
workers. With the election of many Republicans to the U.S. 
Congress in 1946, coupled with an unprecedented wave of 
strike activity during the same year and a public impression 
that unions were being infiltrated and controlled by com 
munists, the stage was set for a major change in the Wagner 
Act.
Passed over the veto of President Truman, the Taft- 
Hartley amendments to the NLRA were signed into law in 
1947. The focus of these amendments was upon union unfair 
labor practices. For the most part the employer ULPs con 
tained in the Wagner Act were not altered. Instead, the 
general intention of Congress was to balance the NLRA, 
checking the power of both unions and employers and, in 
turn, promoting the peaceful resolution of labor- 
management conflict.
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As stated in a declaration of policy of the Taft-Hartley 
Act:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to 
promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the 
legitimate rights of both employees and employers 
in their relations affecting commerce, to provide 
orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the 
interference by either with the legitimate rights of 
the other, to protect the rights of individual 
employees in their relations with labor organiza 
tions whose activities affect commerce, to define 
and proscribe practices on the part of labor and 
management which affect commerce and are in 
imical to the general welfare and to protect the 
rights of the public in connection with labor 
disputes affecting commerce.
The heart of the amendments read:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor 
organization or its agents -
(1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exer 
cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 ... or 
(b) an employer in the selection of his represen 
tatives for purposes of collective bargaining or the 
adjustment of grievances . . .
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
discriminate against an employee" for 
nonmembership in the union unless a union-shop 
agreement is in effect and the employee fails "to 
tender the periodic dues and initiation fees 
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or 
retaining membership;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an 
employer . . .
(4) To engage in or to induce or encourage the 
employees of any employer to engage in, a
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strike ... to use, manufacture, process, transport 
or otherwise handle" goods with the objective of:
"(A) forcing or requiring any . . . self-employed per 
son to join any labor . . . organization . . .
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to 
recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the 
representative of his employees unless such labor 
organization has been certified as the representative 
of such employees . . .
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or 
bargain with a particular labor organization as the 
representative of his employees if another labor 
organization has been certified as the representative 
of such employees . . .
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign par 
ticular work to employees in a particular labor 
organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class 
rather than to employees in another labor organiza 
tion or in another trade, craft, or class . . .
(5) to require of employees covered by an agree 
ment ..." any initiation or admission fees "in an 
amount which the Board finds excessive or 
discriminatory ..." and
"(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to 
pay . . . for services which are not performed or 
not to be performed ..."
In addition to the above unfair labor practices, the Taft- 
Hartley Act amended the NLRA in several other important 
ways which are of special interest to our inquiry about union 
organizing and first-contract negotiation outcomes. First, 
under Section 7 of the Wagner Act, the following clause was 
added in order to make it clear that workers could refrain 
from forming, joining, or assisting unions if they so desired, 
except where a legitimate union-shop agreement had been 
made: "Employees . . . shall also have the right to refrain 
from any or all such activities." Second, Section 14(b) allow-
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ed states to establish so-called right-to-work laws, whereby 
no employer and union within the given state could enter in 
to union-shop agreements (i.e., workers must join unions 
after being hired). Hence, in states passing such legislation, 
workers under a collective bargaining agreement were still 
free not to join the union. Unions, however, still would be 
required to represent fairly these employees as the exclusive 
representative of all employees in a given work unit. Finally, 
the size of the Board was increased from three to five 
members. The purpose of this change was to better facilitate 
the speedy handling of representation elections and the 
resolution of labor-management disputes.
The NLRA was further amended in 1959 with the passage 
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 
more widely known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. Only Title 
VII of the Landrum-Griffin Act, however, amended the 
NLRA. All other titles were promulgated in an attempt to in 
sure union democracy, rid unions of corruption by union 
leaders and corruption between union leaders and 
employers, and to regulate the use of union funds. Although 
there are a number of important amendments under Title 
VII (especially those closing loopholes involving secondary 
boycotts), two amendments are especially pertinent to our 
investigation and those are briefly discussed next.
First, Section 8(b)(7) was added as a seventh union ULP to 
the six enunciated in the Taft-Hartley Act. The proviso holds 
that it is unlawful for a union:
to picket ... or threaten to picket . . . any 
employer where the object thereof is forcing or re 
quiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a 
labor organization ... or forcing or requiring the 
employees of an employer to accept or select a 
labor organization as their collective bargaining 
representative. . . .
The basic restrictions against picketing for recognition pur 
poses are that picketing cannot be conducted (1) for more 
than 30 days, giyen that the union files a successful petition
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with the NLRB to hold a certification election, (2) if another 
union has been lawfully recognized as the representative of 
the employees, or (3) if a valid election concerning union 
representation has been conducted within the previous year.
Second, cases of discrimination against employees by 
either employers or unions for union activities or inactivities 
are to be given priority treatment over all other cases in the 
regional office in which they are filed, except for cases where 
the Board is compelled under section 10(1) of the Act to seek 
injunctions against illegal union strikes, pickets, and 
boycotts.
Except for bringing the U.S. Postal Service and nonprofit 
hospitals under the NLRA in 1971 and 1974, respectively, 
the Act has not undergone any substantive changes since 
1959. However, a labor law reform bill that would have in 
cluded several important amendments to the Act was passed 
easily in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977 but 
failed by one vote in the Senate by filibuster. The provi 
sions of the reform bill were aimed at speeding up NLRB 
procedures and case handling and reducing the incidence of 
discriminatory discharges and employer bad faith bargaining 
during first-contract negotiations. Many of the bill's provi 
sions are discussed and evaluated in chapter 4 and hence are 
not covered in this chapter.
Summary
During the period 1806 to 1932, the federal government 
allowed, for the most part, the federal and state judiciaries 
to dictate public policy regarding union organizing and col 
lective bargaining. It is clear that the federal courts were 
hostile toward union organizing and collective bargaining. 
Their concerns were primarily with disruption of interstate 
commerce, freedom-of-contract, and private property 
rights. The courts initially saw unions as criminal con 
spiracies under common law and later as monopolies under 
antitrust legislation; they readily granted injunctions against 
concerted union activities and enforced yellow-dog con 
tracts.
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Although the U.S. Congress passed legislation to give 
workers limited rights of organizing and collective bargain 
ing (i.e., the Erdman Act, Clayton Act, and Railway Labor 
Act) it was not until the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 was 
passed by Congress that legislative action successfully block 
ed the judiciary from handing out injunctions and enforcing 
yellow-dog contracts. In 1932, the legal environment sur 
rounding union organizing and collective bargaining shifted 
course from a long period of hostility to one characterized as 
a hands-off approach. Shortly thereafter, however, with the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling favorably upon the constitu 
tionality of the Wagner Act in 1937, the legal environment 
became one that encouraged union organizing and collective 
bargaining and in today's sociopolitical context, ignored the 
rights of employers and workers not interested in collective 
bargaining. With passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 
the legal environment then shifted to one of intended 
neutrality, protecting the rights of workers to decide whether 
or not they wanted union representation and balancing the 
power of both unions and employers. Since 1947, that gen 
eral philosophy of labor relations law has been maintained.
Legal philosophy and its day-to-day realization, however, 
are frequently at odds. Part of being at odds can be at 
tributed to the fact that parties subject to the law and af 
fected adversely by it, often work hard to successfully under 
mine it. Disparity between legal philosophy and practice can 
also be attributed to the fact that the makers of law are 
unaware that legal niceties often fail to result in anticipated 
outcomes. With respect to negotiating first contracts, it will 
be shown in this study that many employers have found effi 
cient and cheap ways to undermine the law. In turn, policy 
recommendations that obviate some legal niceties are 
prescribed in an attempt to bring day-to-day practices in line 
with our legal philosophies.
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